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IN ,.fHE SUPREME COlJRT 
OF THE STATE OF U'JCAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Interest of 
KARL BAILEY 
Alleged dependent and 
neglected child. 
Case 
No. 8722 
AP·PELLAN'T.'S BRIEF 
Submitted by J. GORDON BAILEY, Father of the 
Alleged Dependent and Neglected Child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 30, 1957, Virginia Lee Bennett, Executive 
Secretary of the Children's Service Society of Utah, filed 
a petition (R. 10) in the Juvenile Court of the Second 
Juvenile District in and for Salt Lake County alleging 
Karl Bailey, the son of J. Gordon Bailey, Appellant 
herein and frequently referred to as Gordon, to be a 
neglected and dependent child within the purview of 
Utah law. The Children's Service Society of Utah will 
be referred to herein as the Society, and since the uncon-
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tradicted evidence is that the child was named Karl Ber-
nett Bailey, he will be referred to by that name, or simply 
as Karl. May 8, 1957, Gordon filed his cross petition 
(R. 11), and after a rather lengthy hearing in the matter 
the Court made findings of fact and conclusions of la"\v 
(R. 22) and entered its Decree and Judgment (R. 25), 
adjudging Karl to be a neglected child within the pur~ 
view of Utah law, depriving Gordon of all rights to the 
custody of his son and authorizing the Society to arrange 
for his adoption by unidentified foster parents in \vhose 
care he had been previously placed by the Society. 
Gordon, presently employed as a caretaker at a duck 
club and an artist by profession, ''Tas reared and educated 
in Utah. After completing high school and prior to his 
induction into the United States Army Air Corps in June 
of 1943 (R. 214) he was employed in California (R. 212, 
213). While serving as a member of the .. A.ir Corps he 
became Yery interested in the study of art (R-. 214) and 
after his return to civilian life, in January, 1946, he 
undertook the study of art at various schools, utilizing 
his service-earned benefits under the G. I. Bill for this pur-
pose ( R. 215). He has sold paintings and has partici-
pated in numerous art exhibits throughout the country 
(R. 215, 216, Ex. 14-). 
On November 19, 1951, Gordon married one ~Iartha 
Bn llder Singer in l\[exico ( R. ~15), \Yhich marriage \Yas 
dissolved by a decree of annulment .A .. pril 5, 1952 (R. 96), 
although the .J UYPnile ( 'jourt found such annulment to 
have bePn 011 ~t"\ptember 24, 1953. This point ''ill be cov-
ered in t hP n rgument following. 
~) 
.... 
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In the latter part of 1952, or the early part of 1953, 
Gordon met Margaret Susan Willis (now Mrs. Jesse 
Sharp and called both Margaret and Susan in the record, 
and referred to herein as Susan) at an art exhibit ban-
quet (R. 276). Susan had been born in Canada and raised 
in England (R. 275). While in England Susan conceived 
an illegitmate child (R. 275) which was born after Susan 
and her family had migrated to the United States (R. 
275), and was placed for adoption out of state (R. 275). 
Susan returned to Utah where she resided with her par-
ents in Provo and later in Salt Lake City (R. 275, 276). 
Shortly after she met Gordon, Susan asked him if 
she could go live with him at Logan, Utah, vvhere he 
was attending college (R. 278). There is conflict in the 
evidence as to the nature of their relationship prior to 
this point. In any event Gordon and Susan lived together 
as man and vvife, but without the benefit of a formal mar-
riage, from this time in 1953 until the end of October, 
1955 (R. 22, Finding No. 2). There is a substantial con-
flict in the evidence as to why they were not formally 
married, each contending that he desired so to do but 
that the other refused, insisting such a formality to be 
unnecessary. 
During the first part of this time they traveled about 
the country, Gordon pursuing his study of art at various 
schools (R. 280-284). They held themselves out to others 
as being married (R. 89). Susan's family did not lmow 
that they were not married until after Susan left Gordon 
in October, 1955 (R. 40, 41, 176). 
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At one time Susan became pregnant, but this preg-
nancy was terminated by a miscarriage at Santa Rosa, 
California (R. 285). 
In the spring of 1954 Susan became pregnant again. 
In the fall of 1954 Gordon and Susan obtained employ-
ment as caretakers at a duck club near Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R. 35, 292). On January 7, 1955, their child was 
born at the duck club (R. 220, 221, 222, Ex. 7). Gordon 
and Susan were alone and the child was deliYered \Yith-
out the aid of. a doctor and without serious complications 
though Susan testified that the child had some trouble, 
breathing as though it had a cold (R. 304, 305). Gordon 
prepared, signed and filed a birth certificate (Ex. 7) 
naming himself as the father and Susan as the mother. 
As with many of the occurrences in this case, the rea-
sons for the natural childbirth, \Yho desired it, and similar 
rna tters are in conflict. 
Gordon notified Susan's mother of the birth of her 
grandchild (R. 39). Susan's father named the child Karl 
Bernett Bailey ( R. 17 4), Bernett being the middle name 
of a deceased brother of Gordon (R. 151). 
Gordon, Susan and l{arllived at the club as a family 
unit from the birth of the child in January until the end 
of October of the same year, during \Yhich time Gordon 
held l(arl out ns his son, admitting publicly the pater-
nity of the child - neY(?r denying it - and treating the 
ehild in all respt}ets as his son (R. 44, 89, 108, 112, 113, 
1:21, 12~, 130, 133, 134, 137, 140, 164, ~~~). Friends, rela-
tiYPS and nt)ighhor~ t('stified at the hearing that the child 
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appeared exceptionally healthy and that Gordon .,.was very 
fond of it (R. 108, 112, 113, 114, 121, 122, 130, 134, 141, 
142), although Susan and members of her family testified 
that the child suffered from colds, jaundice and diarrhea 
(R. 39, 46, 305). 
Near the end of October, 1955, about ten months after 
l{arl 's birth, one Jesse Sharp, formerly a close friend of 
Gordon, and referred to herein as Sharp, visited for about 
three days at the club (R. 309). The day after he left 
Susan went into Salt Lake City where she met Sharp 
(R. 311). They returned to the club and informed Gor-
don that they desired to be together (R. 313). They packed 
some of Susan's things and, taking Karl with them, left 
the club (R. 313). Gordon drove them into Salt Lake 
City (R. 314). He testified that he did so, under strain, 
rather than risk trouble should their departure be delayed 
(R. 224). The following day Susan and Sharp left Utah 
for Sacramento, California, and were married in Reno, 
Nevada, enroute (R. 314). 
Immediately after Susan, Sharp and Karl left the 
club, Gordon and Susan's parents attempted to find her, 
but their efforts "\Vere futile (R. 40, 145, 163, 17 4, 175, 181, 
226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231). By a letter dated Novem-
ber 10, 1955, and bearing only a general delivery, Sacra-
mento, California, return address, Susan notified Gordon 
that she and Sharp were married (Ex. 8). 
This marriage was not a happy one and in Decem-
ber of that same year, Susan returned with Karl to her 
parents' home in Salt Lake City. She testified that she 
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thought that if her parents would care for Karl for two 
or three weeks so that she and Sharp could spend a little 
time together their marriage might improve (R. 315, 318). 
Gordon saw Susan at this time, but the unplanned meet-
ing was not a friendly one (R. 236, 316). Gordon's subse-
quent attempts to communicate with Susan were termi-
nated by a letter from Sharp to Gordon, postmarked Feb-
ruary 2, 1956, Salt Lake City, Utah, but without any fur-
ther return address, addressed to Gordon, who at the time 
was working at Moab, Utah, curtly informing him 
that any further letters would be returned to him 
unopened (Ex. 11). 
Unsuccessful in her attempt to get someone to care 
for Karl, and without contacting Gordon or any member 
of his family, Susan approached the Children's Service 
Society of Utah on February 7, 1956, to arrange for tem-
porarily leaving Karl "Tith the Society (R. 317). On be-
half of the Society, evidence ''as offered that Susan told 
them that the father of the child \Yas Joe Bailey to -whom 
she was not married, and that the child \\as born in De-
cember, 1954 (R. 56, 70). \\'ithin a da:~ or t\vo l{arl was 
left with the Society. Susan did not return for him and 
apparently her only contact "Tith the Societ:T between such 
time and November 21, 1956, consisted of t"To short phone 
calls (R. 58). 
In the summer of 1956, Gordon met Lee Deffebach 
!{anson (also refPrred to in the record as Helen Hortense 
T__Jee Deffehneh Hanson), kno"Tn to her acquaintances as 
LeP and so referred to herein (R. 195). 
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Lee, a graduate from the University of Utah with a 
B.A. degree in Art (R. 187) had married one Mr. Hanson 
and shortly thereafter the two of them went to Europe. 
Lee had been awarded a Fullbright scholarship for the 
study of art in Europe. This marriage was not successful, 
terminating in Mr. Hanson's suing for divorce in June, 
1956. Lee did not contest the action (R. 207). The decree 
became final December 12, 1956. Lee went to live with Gor-
don at the club about the end of August, and upon the expi-
ration of the time for the prior decree to become final they 
were married. This was December 14, 1956 (R. 23, 196). 
Gordon testified that from the December meeting 
with Susan to the commencement of this action he had no 
knowledge of the whereabouts of Susan or Karl. 
On December 7, 1956, a petition was filed in the Ju-
venile Court in Salt Lake City alleging Karl to be a de-
pendent and neglected child (R. 4). Gordon received no 
notice of this action and was not a party thereto (R. 30). 
On December 10, 1956, the petition filed three days earlier 
was modified to sho\v the father's name to be J. Gordon 
Bailey and the date of birth to be January 7, 1955 (R. 4). 
At a hearing on December 12, 1956, Susan and a Mrs. 
Alice Olson of the Society were present ( R. 1). Findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and an order of continuance 
were made (R. 7). 
Without breaking the sequence of fact, it should be 
here noted that L,ee Deffebach Bailey had been an ac-
quaintance of Virginia Lee Bennett, petitioner in the in-
stant case and Executive Secreary of the Children's Serv-
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ice Society of Utah, since about 1948 (R. 79, 80, 84). Vir-
ginia Lee Bennett testified that she had contacted Lee 
during the summer of 1956, having been informed by 
Lee's parents that she could contact Lee by calling the 
phone number of the club, which she did (R. 80). She also 
testified that she had received in December, 1956, an 
announcement of Gordon's and Lee's marriage. Virginia 
I_.jee Bennett testified that it was not until the hearing on 
December 10, 1956 (R. 4) that the Society knew that J. 
Gordon Bailey was the father of Karl and his consent 
necessary for adoption (R. 87, 88, 89). 
Virginia Lee Bennett testified that two or three days 
after Christmas in that same month she had a conversa-
tion with Lee and that Lee told her that she and Gordon 
\\'"ere going to take a trip to California (R. 81). At no 
time did Virginia Lee Bennett inform Lee that the Society 
had custody of Gordon's child (R. 85). During the time 
that Gordon and Lee 'Yere out of the state, Susan ap-
peared before the J uYenile Court and relinquished all of 
her rights to Karl (R. 8). The Court made its order 
placing l(arl 'Yith the Society for placement for adop-
tion ( R. 9, 86). This "~as January 16, 1957 (R. 1, 8, 9). 
No effort was made by Virginia Lee Bennett, or the So-
ciety, to contact Gordon or to inform him in any manner 
that the Society had custody of his child until three 
months after Susan had relinquished her rights (R. 86}. 
On April 19, 1957, Gordon \\'"as contacted by the Society. 
On 1\pril ~~'he \Yas askPd to release l(arl so that he could 
hP plaePd for adoption (R. 59, 60 .. 86). 
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At no time since the Society first obtained custody of 
Karl has Gordon been allowed or requested to take care 
of his son (R. 70, 86). 
According to Virginia Lee Bennett and to Mrs. Olson, 
Gordon said at the interview of April 22, 1956, that he 
would never consent to the adoption of his child, that he 
would not fight any proceedings, but that he hoped that 
the outcome of the interview would be the return of Karl 
to him (R. 62, 71, 81). At about this time Virginia Lee 
Bennett informed Gordon in response to his inquiry that 
I{arl had not been placed for adoption as of that time 
(R. 346). 
On April 30, 1957, the case at bar was initiated by a 
petition filed by Virginia Lee Bennett alleging Karl to be 
a neglected and dependent child on the following grounds: 
( 1) that Gordon had abandoned the child, ( 2) that the 
~hild lacked proper parental care because of the faults 
and habits of Gordon, (3) that Gordon has refused and 
neglected to provide proper care and necessary subsis-
tence, medical and other care, and ( 4) that the child was 
in a situation dangerous to its health and morals by rea-
son of the· foregoing and the irresponsible and immoral 
conduct of Gordon. The petition alleged that for the above 
reasons, Karl became a neglected and dependent child on 
the 30th day of April, 1957 (R. 10). The Society had had 
Karl in its custody from about February 9 of the previous 
year (R. 4). 
By a cross petition filed May 8, 1957, Gordon denied 
the allegations of dependency and neglect and alleged, 
9 
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inter alia, that the child was his legitimate son by virtue 
of compliance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
1953, 78-30-12; that because he did not know and had not 
been informed of the whereabouts of his son he had not 
been able to care for him; that he and his wife desired the 
return of the child; that they are competent and capable 
persons to have the custody and care of the child; that his 
wife desires to adopt the child as her own; and that the 
Society refused to return the child to him (R. 11-15). 
In the course of the hearing that ensued, the peti-
tioner introduced evidence concerning the events preced-
ing the placing of the child with the Society and subse-
quent thereto, including testimony concerning medical 
treatment, religion, philosophy of life, alleged sexual de-
viations, unfitness of the home at the club and numerous 
diverse matters. 
At the end of the petitioner's evidence in chief, a 
motion to dismiss the petition was denied (R. 107). 
Gordon introduced testimony in his ov.~ behalf re-
butting that of the petitioner~ and showing his Yersion of 
the matters raised by the petitioner. 
The greatest part of the 3:21 pages of testimony are 
concerned '''ith events prior to Gordon's marriage to Lee 
in Decemh(ll\ 1956, and include the fullest scope of inquiry 
imaginable. To recite in detail this testimony would 
undul~r h)ng-then this brief. 
Aftt)r the close of the evidenre in rhief for Gordon, 
the petitionpr offered nnd the Court admitted, oYer ob-
.ie('t ion, P\·idenr(\ to the effect that unidentified foster par-
10 
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POINT II. 
KAR.L BERNETT BAILEY IS NOT A NE.G-
LECTED CHILD WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE 
LAW AND THEREFORE THE COURT WAS WITH-
OUT POWER TO DEPRIVE J. GORDON BAILEY 
OF THE. CUSTODY OF HIS SON. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND 
IN CONSIDERING IN ITS DECISION EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING ALLEGED ADOPTIVE P AR~~~TS. 
POINT IV. 
THE ORDER PURPORTING TO DEPRIVE J. 
GOR.DON BAILEY PERMANENTlY OF ALL 
RIGHTS TO THE CUSTODY OF HIS SON AND TO 
AUTHORIZE HIS ADOPTION IS VOID BECAUSE 
IT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS AND 
IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
POIXT ,T. 
EVEN ASSUlVIING THE JUVENILE COURT 
TO HAVE HAD THE POWER TO TEMPORARILY 
DEPRIVE J. GORDON BAILEY OF THE CUSTODY 
OF HIS SON, TO· DO SO WAS AN ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
POINT \ .. 1. 
THE· JUDGMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW DO NOT SUPPORT IT. 
12 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL c·O·URT ER.RED IN FAIJ-.JING TO 
FIND KARL BERNETT BAILEY TO BE ~rHE L·E-
GITIMATE SON OF J. GORDO·N BAILEY. 
Although the court says in its conclusions of law 
(R. 24) that "the child may be considered a legitimate 
child because of the recognition of said child as his son 
by J. Gordon Bailey,'' from the entire treatment of the 
case, from the pleadings before Gordon was made a party 
to the suit through to the summary order that because of 
Gordon's faults and habits and manner of living l{arl was 
to be permanently denied the privilege of knowing his 
father, it is apparent that the meaning of the clause above 
quoted is in effect a denial of a finding of legitimacy. 
Susan has voluntarily left the picture. Half of 
Karl's natural family has abandoned him. Only his fa-
ther remains loyal to his child. The treatment accorded 
Gordon in this case and the principles applied to its de-
termination are not consistent with the status of parent 
and legitimate child, but are consonant with the cruel 
legal principles reserved as a social punishment for those 
cases wherein a father of an illegitimate child attempts 
to obtain its custody from an adverse party having an 
equal or superior right. 
By a long-standing provision in our law, borrowed 
from the California Civil Code, Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
78-30-12, provides: 
13 
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The father of an illegitimate child, by pub-
licly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as 
such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, 
into his family, and otherwise treating it as if, it 
were a legitimate child, there by adopts it as such, 
and such child is thereupon deemed for all pur-
poses legitimate from the time of its birth. 
The term ''adoption'' in this statute means and is 
used in the sense of ''legitimation.'' 
Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 32, 31 P. 915; (1892); 
Re McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 19 L.R.A. 40 
(1919); 
Re Navarro, 77 Cal. App. 2d 500,175 P. 2d 896 (1946). 
The effect of such legitimation by acknowledgment, 
in the absence of any provision in the law to the contrary, 
is to confer upon the child and the parent the same rights 
and status as though the child had been born in lawful 
wedlock, according to each the reciprocal rights and 
duties of and the same as all legitimate children and their 
parents. The wording of the statute in this regard is quite 
clear: ''and such child is thereupon deemed for all pur-
poses legitimate from the time of its birth.'' 
Pfeiffer Y. TTT right, 41 F. 2d 464, 73 A.L.R. 932 (1930); 
Alrison v. Bryan., 21 Okla. 557, 97 P. 282, 18 L.R.A. 
(n. s.) 931 (1908). 
By the expression, ''publicly acknowledging it as 
his own,'' is mennt the disclosure of the fact of paternity, 
\vithout conet'nlmeut, to r<.~latiYes, friends, acquaintances, 
and others. 
14 
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In re Skinrner's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 2d 528, 151 P. 2d 
31 (1944); 
In re Gathings' Estate, 199 Okla. 460, 187 P. 2d 9-81 
(1947); 
In reFlood's Estate, 217 Cal. 763, 21 P. 2d 579(1933); 
In re Baird's Estate, 173 Cal. 617, 160 P. 1078 (1916); 
In re Garr, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906); 
In re Gird's Estate, 157 Cal. 534, 108 P. 499 (1910). 
Gordon publicly acknowledged that he was Karl's 
father by filling out and filing the certificate of birth de-
scribing himself as the father (Ex. 11). In Estate of Mc-
Namara the court said that there could be no more public 
acknowledgment than the act of the father in signing the 
child's birth certificate describing himself as the father. 
Immediately following Karl's birth, Gordon notified 
Susan's mother (R. 39). Susan's father named the child, 
giving it the middle name of Bernett which is is the mid-
dle name of a brother of Gordon, now deceased (R. 174, 
151). Gordon publicly acknowledged that Karl was his 
son to all with whom he came into contact (R. 44, 89, 108, 
112, 113, 121, 122, 130, 133, 134, 137, 140, 164, 222). Wit-
nesses for the petitioner are among this group. The rec-
ord is abundantly filled with evidence to this effect; it is 
absolutely devoid of any denial of pat'ernity or inference 
of any denial of paternity. Acknowledgment of paternity 
has been made to the petitioner (R. 91), in open court 
(R. 92), to friends (R. 155) and to acquaintances 
(R. 164, 273). 
15 
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The household of a bachelor constitutes a ''family'' 
as also does the household of the father even though he 
may be living in an unlawful relationship with the child's 
mother. 
In re Garr, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906); 
In re Jones' Esta.te, 166 Cal.108, 135 P. 288 (1913); 
In re Gathirngs' Estate, 199 Okla. 460, 187 P. 2d 981 
1947); 
Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 7 A.L.R. 
131 (1919); 
In Re McGrew, 183 Cal. 177, 190 P. 804 (1920). 
The father was a bachelor in the Garr case. In the 
]feN ama,ra case the father lived with the child's mother 
who was the lawful \Yife of another. In the JlcGre1v case 
the parents lived \Yithout the benefit of the marriage cere-
mony as man and \vife. To hold otherwise would defeat 
the obvious purpose and the plain meaning of the 
statute. 
Gordon, Susan and l{arl lived together as a family 
unit until Susan's departure \Yith Sharp (R. 44, 45, 89, 
113, 121). Susan had so testified, according to the 
record, in the earlier proceedings (R. 6). The court spe-
cifically found that Gordon and Susan lived together as 
man and wife from February ~1, 1953, to October 30, 1955 
( R. 22, No. ~). 
Gordon's previous marriage cannot affect the appli-
cation of t ht~ leg-itimation statute, for that marriage \Yas 
16 
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terminated prior to Karl's birth. The Court err.ed some-
what in its finding that Gordon was married to one 
Martha Dander Singer from June 22, 1952, to September 
24, 1953. The translation of the document (R. 95) and 
the document itself (Ex. 1) show that Gordon 'vas mar-
ried to one Martha Bander Singer on November 19, 1951, 
and that the date of the annulment is April 5, 1952. A 
careful reading of either the translation or the original 
shows that September 24, 1953, is the date borne by the 
copy in evidence, which is a combination of the 1narriage 
and the annulment records. Error or not, Gordon was not 
married to another at the time he lived with Susan, and 
the evidence is clear that he had not been married to 
Singer for over two and one-half years prior to Karl's 
birth. 
That Karl was ''received'' into Gordon's family can-
not be seriously questioned. Receiving is accomplished 
by a physical acceptance or being of the child, even though 
for a short length of time in the household of the father. 
In this instance the time was not short, it was over nine 
months. 
The Jon.es, Gathings, McGrew, and McNamara cases, 
previously cited, support this proposition. So also does 
In re Buffington's Estate, 169 Oka 487, 38 P. 2d 22 (1934). 
In the Jones case two months sufficed ; in the Gathings 
case visits to the father's abode were held sufficient. 
As to the ''otherwise treating it as if it were a le-
gitimate child'' portion of the statute the result is equally 
clear. The standard set is the treatment which the par-
17 
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ticular father in question would have given to a legitimate 
child under the same circumstances, not what he should 
give, nor what the majority of men would give, to such 
a child. 
Re Kessler's Estate, 74 N.W. 2d 599 (S.Dak. 1956). 
Estate of Heaton, 139 Cal. 237, 73 P. 186 (1903); 
In re Gird's Estate, 157 Cal. 534, 108 P. 499; (1910); 
In re Jones' Estate, 166 Cal. 108, 135 P. 288 ( 1913) ; 
The record shows that Gordon took good care of his 
child, despite the concerted attempts of the petitioner's 
witnesses to show illness. The conclusion to be drawn 
from the evidence is that Gordon "~as very fond of his 
son, and was proud of him. He was taken with him w 
visit neighbors. He was treated as if he were legitimate. 
The evidence is not controverted with regard to the 
legitimation of l(arl. One wonders if the cumulative 
effect of the prior proceedings wherein the attempt by 
parties present to brand l{arl as illegtimate was consis-
tentl~,. made (note, for example, the statement to such 
effect in the Appearance, Waiver and Consent for Adop-
tion appearing on eourt stationery (R. 8)) and the pre-
vious actions of the court taken upon such a premise of 
illegitimacy may not haYe served to construct too high a 
hurdle for the full appreciation of the legal significance of 
the facts presented to the court in the hearing. 
Were the failure of the court to find Karl legitimate 
merelr an error of form, there 'vould be little ground for 
complaint. TIH--. error, ho,veYPl\ 'Yas mor<? than one of hol-
18 
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low form - it was very substantial. Failure to consider 
Karl to be the legitimate son of Gordon, from the begin.: 
ning .of this series of actions, undoubtedly contributed 
greatly to the treatment of this case as though it were a 
habeas corpus proceeding. 
There is a material difference between a habeas cor-
pus proceeding and a statutory action such as this. The 
first is usually a contest between persons each having a 
similar or nearly equal interest in the child. The latter 
is an action brought in the name of the state in a court of 
limited jurisdiction and power, not to determine relative 
rights of custody, but initially at least, to determine 
whether the conditions existing at the time of the peti-
tion and hearing are such as to require the intervention 
of the state in the interest of the child, and if so, then to 
apply the power of the state, pursuant to the law, for that 
purpose. That purpose is the interest of the child, not the 
interest of an adoption agency with a waiting list. 
POINT II. 
KAR.L BERNETT BAILEY IS NOT A NE,G-
LECTED CHILD WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE 
LAW AND THEREFO·RE THE COURT. WAS WITH-
OUT POWER TO DEPRIVE J. GORDON BAILEY 
OF THE. CUSTODY OF HIS SO·N. 
The Juvenile Courts of the State of Utah are spe-
cially created courts of limited jurisdiction. The source of 
their jurisdiction is Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-5, which 
provides with reference to the issues on this appeal: 
19 
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The juvenile court shall have the exclusive original 
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, de-
pendency, and delinquency of children who are 
under eighteen years of age, ... and the custody, 
detention, guardianship of the person, trial and 
care of such neglected, dependent and delinquent 
children .... 
Prior cases in this court have affirmed the rule that 
unless the facts of the controversy bring the case within 
the scope of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, such 
court does not have the power to interfere or act in the 
matter. And in order to make a determination with ref-
erence to the child and a parent, such parent must also 
be before the court. 
In re Bennett, 77 Utah 247, 293 P. 963 (1930); 
In re Graham, 110 Utah 159, 170 P. 2d 172 (1946): 
In re Johnson, 110 Utah 500, 175 P. 2d 486 (1946); 
In re Bradley, 109 Utah 538, 167 P. 2d 978 (1946) . 
.t\lthough alleged to be both a dependent and neg-
lected child in the petition filed by \"'"irginia Lee Bennett 
April 30, 1957, the court's failure to find "~ith reference 
to dependeney eliminates that aspect of the ca.se. Neg-
lect, as concerns our controYersy, is statutorily defined 
and limited bY Utah Code .A.Jlll. 1953, 55-10-6: 
The \Yords ''neglected child'' include: 
A ehild "Tho is abandoned hy his parents, guardian 
or custodian. 
A ehild "Tho larks proper parental eare by reason 
of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian or 
enRtodian. 
20 
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A child whose parent, guardian or custodian neg-
lects or refuses to provide proper or necessary 
subsistence, education, medical or surgical care or 
other care necessary for his health, morals or well-
being. 
A child whose parent, guardian or custodian neg-
lects or refuses to provide the special care made 
necessary by his mental condition. 
A child who is found in a disreputable place or who 
associates with vagrant, vicious or immoral 
persons. 
A child who engages in an occupation or is in a 
situation dangerous to the life or limb or injurious 
to the health or morals of himself or others. 
This court in the Joh(fi)Son case stated, at page 
489, with reference to dependency, "the law con-
templates a then existing condition of dependency 
that requires the intervention of the juvenile court.'' 
The definitions of a ''dependent child'' in this same 
section of the statute, Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-6, 
are also in the present tense. The Johnson case rule is 
applicable with equal vigor for the prevention of unwar-
ranted court action in an alleged ''neglected child'' case 
as well as in a ''dependent child'' case. 
It would be an anomalous situation and undoubtedly a 
deprivation of due process to confer upon the juvenile 
court jurisdiction of a child because one parent fails in its 
duties when the other parent has not and allow the court 
to deprive the non-erring parent of the custody of his 
child permanently by virtue of the default of the other. 
21 
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There is authority for the proposition that even the 
petition is void if it fails to include the essential elements 
required for jurisdiction. This court's holding in the 
J ohn,son case is applicable here. 
A realization by the juvenile court that the Society's 
failure to attempt to locate Gordon, their refusal to return 
Karl to Gordon and their exclusive custody of the child 
had effectively foreclosed any opportunity for Gordon 
to care for his child during the entire period commencing 
February 9, 1956, and continuing unbroken to the time of 
the hearing should have limited the court's inquiry, if 
any, to the question of whether Gordon had abandoned 
his child. 
Abandonment was alleged in the petition; it ''Tas not 
found by the court. Not stopping a mother from taking 
her nine-month-old nursing child with her hardly consti-
tutes abandonment by the father. 
In re Walton, 123 Utah 380, 259 P. 2d 881 (1953); 
Jensen v. Ea.rley, 63 Utah 604, 228 P. ~17 (1924); 
35 A.L.R. 2d 663 contains a comprehensiYe collection 
. 
of recent cases. 
The second allegation is that because of the faults 
and habits of the father, the child lacks proper parental 
care. The facts alleged relate to the preYious relation-
ship between Gordon and Susan and a non-specific gen-
0ral nllegation of ''other faults and habits.'' 
Th(l t the eourt errPd to tla~ substantial prejudicial 
t 1 rror of thP child and his father 'Yhen the eourt decreed 
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"that J. Gordon Bailey, because of his faults and habits 
and manner of living should not have the custody of his 
child returned to him and is hereby deprived of his rights 
to the custody of said child," is self-evident upon a com-
parison of the findings of the juvenile court with the evi-
dence before it. Substantially three-fourths of the court's 
findings are based on Susan's testimony, or consist not 
of findings of fact at all, but of mere recitals of Susan's 
statements. Her testimony is, in the main, unsubstan-
tiated by any of the other twenty-one witnesses in 
the case. 
For example (R. 22, Para. 2) " ... Susan Willis 
Sharp met J. Gordon Bailey at an art exhibit and kept 
company for a short time engaging in sexual intercourse 
without marriage ... '' is unsupported by any evidence 
except the statement of Susan herself, which is contra-
dicted by Gordon (R. 258). 
In paragraph 4, " ... while in California Susan Willis 
had a miscarriage and was given no medical care by her 
husband; that she testified that she asked Mr. Bailey for 
medical attention but was refused ... ''; the testimony of 
lack of medical care is supported only by Susan's testi-
mony (R. 260, 261) and refuted by Gordon (R. 269). 
Also in paragraph 4, " .... the mother testified that 
J. Gordon Bailey in refusing to give her medical attention 
said that birth was a natural thing; that animals did not 
have doctors in giving birth to their offspring and that 
doctors infected people with cancer so that they could 
continue getting money from their patients.'' Again this 
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testimony from the mother who has abandoned two chil-
dren to adoption agencies is refuted by the father who 
wants to raise his own child himself (R. 265). 
In paragraph 5, the court says that Susan further 
testified as to Gordon's forcing her to participate in un-
natural sex practices and that he engaged in unnatural 
sex practices with her brother, age 12. No other evidence 
supports this statement, which even the court did not :find 
as a fact, but merely repeated. One wonders why the 
boy was not brought before the court. 
Also, in paragraph 5, repeating evidence, but not 
finding facts, the court made reference to Susan's testi-
mony that Gordon suggested she become a prostitute and 
the suggestion that she have a girl friend come li'\Te \nth 
them so they could have sex relations as a trio. Later, 
with reference to the girl friend, Susan contradicted her 
prior testimony and admitted that she might have made 
the suggestion herself (R. 320). What \Yeight is to be ac-
corded to this V{Oman 's contradictory eYidence? 
.1\nd in Paragraph 8 (R,. 23), the court recited "that 
Susan testified that just prior to her lea-'\ing, J. Gordon 
Bailey said "he hoped he could dump the baby and her.'' 
This non-finding of fact recital of hearsay testimony 
has been blown out of proportion eYen by being inserted 
i 11 the findings, for Susan said that Sharp told her this 
( R. 283). Is this t h P eYidencl~ upon ". hich a parent-child 
rclation~hip, already partially dismembered, is to be com-
}>1(\1 ely extinguished~ 
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The finding (R. 23, Para. 11) '' ... that his ouly effort 
for the custody of the child was after he was contacted by 
the Children's Service Society and he then learned that 
the child was being considered for adoption, . . . '' is 
equally clearly contrary to the overwhelming vTeight of 
the evidence, even that supplied by the petitioner's case, 
as far as the inference that Gordon made no attempt to 
find his son prior to being notified the Society had him. 
Susan's mother testified that Gordon was upset when 
Susan left (R. 40); that Gordon tried to locate the child 
(R. 44). Alice Olsen testified that Gordon contacted 
Susan and the child during the first three months after 
Susan's departure (R. 70). Sharp's sister testified that 
Gordon asked her where Susan was (R. 163). Testimony 
by Susan's father indicated Gordon wanted Susan to 
return (R. 163). Gordon testified the child was taken only 
over his objection (R. 226). At this time, Gordon con-
tacted the Willis's, Sharp's sister, and others (R. 225, 
226, 229, 231). He visited Sharp's mother (R. 163). He 
\Vrote to Susan (R. 236, 237) asking their return. He and 
Susan's parents traveled to Goldhill, Nevada, in search of 
Susan and Karl (R. 174). Gordon communicated with 
Sharp's brother (R. 234), and testified he checked with 
the bus and train stations (R. 231). 
The determination that Gordon's manner of living 
is such that he should not have the child is totally unsup-
ported by any competent evidence. Only Susan, her moth-
e.r, and Alice Olsen testified adversely to his living con-
ditions, while Mr. Johnson, and l{aryl J. Lamont, people 
\vith no axe to grind, indicated quite to the contrary (R. 
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171, 172, 186). Mr. Johnson's tetimony (starting at R. 
_170) should be given the credence and weight it deserves. 
He raised a family in the same house. 
As to the care of the child, only Susan and Susan's 
sister intimate any mistreatment of the child, while nu-
merous other witnesses indicated to the contrary and that 
the child was happy and exceptionally healthy (R. 109, 
113, 121, 130, 131, 134, 141, 142). The only testimony of 
illness is from Susan and her mother. Gordon's boss for 
the past four years indicated Gordon to be a good worker, 
and at times to ',York too hard (R. 128). 
The evidence as to sexual deviation is so suspect that 
it deserves no weight. The basic source of this testimony 
is the woman who on one hand says Gordon forced her 
to have unnatural sexual intercourse "~hile at the same 
time testifying that while living with him for three years 
she wanted to marry him, begged him to marry her in 
fact. Which story is true~ It is suggested that each sug-
gests mendacity in the other. Even Susan's sister, who 
testified about advances to,vard her by Gordon, -was a fre-
quent visitor at Gordon's home nonetheless. Is her story 
to be given any substantial \Veight? The proper conclu-
sion is that no improper adYances were made (R. 71~78). 
Witnesses testified that they \vould prefer Gordon 
to raise their children should they be unable to (R. 109, 
131, 135, 138). 
The only renl evidence of neglect of the child is the 
child's eondition ""hen Susan turned it over to the Society, 
after hn ving had it in hPr care for over three months. 
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The petitioner's evidence is that at that time the child 
suffered from allergies, a rash and a bronchial c Jndition. 
Who refused the child medical care~ Even the court 
found it apparently healthy while in Gordon's home 
(R. 23, Para. 8). 
Susan's mother was accepted by the court as a medical 
expert. Surely she or Susan would have obtained aid be-
fore bringing the child to the Society. But it is clear they 
tlid not. Now they come in and complain about Gordon. 
?\Iuch ado is made about Gordon's failure to have the child 
immunized against various diseases. It is clear that at 
the time Susan or her mother could have done so with-
out Gordon's alleged resistance, that they did not (R. 56). 
It is common knowledge that many children are con-
ceived and born out of \vedlock and that a majority of 
these children are taken from their natural parents and 
placed for adoption through the services of state licensed 
agencies. The increased tendency to juvenile delinquency 
in unnatural parent-child units is \vell known. In this 
instance there is the wonderful opportunity to reunite 
a father and a so11. l\1 ust "business as usual" be so im-
mune to obvious merits of a natural parent-child relation-
ship as to deny this child the right to know his father 
in order that the orderly procedures of the Society be not 
disrupted. 
Actually the greater part of the 321 pages of the 
transcript of the oral testimony concerned itself v1ith what 
the Appellant submits to be immaterial and irrelevant 
Inatters inte11ded to prove that because of past conduct 
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the child was neglected. It is impossible to consider all of 
the evidence in the limited scope of this brief. The Apel-
lant respectfully submits that this Court's responsibility 
extends to a careful study of the evidence and the record. 
The conclusion is inescapable that the question of 
''neglect'' as defined by Utah law was shunted aside and 
the case determined by rules which are applicable to a 
different set of facts. In a contest as to custody between 
two persons each having a natural or legal right to a 
child, it may not be improper to weigh carefully in the 
scales of justice the various factors which the court con-
siders to affect the interests of the child. This is not im-
proper because regardless of which person gets the child, 
it is a person with a right to the child in the first instance. 
Such is not the case here. The petitioner and the Society 
have no rights to Karl save such as might be attributable 
to the order of the Juvenile Court in the matter. Their 
only interest other,Yise is that interest prompted by the 
nature of the Society's ac.tiYity- placing of children for 
adoption \Vi th people not even parties to the contest. In-
stead of concerning itself with the question of ''neglect'' 
it is apparent that the petitioner's position that she would 
not place a child in Gordon ,s home for adoption set for 
the court the minimum standard \Yith regard to whether 
Gordon would ever see his child again and controlled the 
court's determination of the matter. One questions 
whether our society is so socialized that a father must 
gain the p<.)rmission of an adoption agency before he can 
enjoy the love and companionship of his o'Yn son. 
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The law is well settled that the decisive it.sue in a 
proceeding of this nature is the initial determination, free 
from other factors, of whether the child is a ''neglected 
child.'' If not, it follows that the court is withc~ut juris-
diction to interfere with a parent's rights to its child. 
In re Youn.g, 180 Ore.187, 174 P. 2d 189 (1946); 
In re John,son., 110 Utah 500, 175 P. 2d 486 (1946); 
State v. Pogue, 282 S.W. 2d (Springfield Ct. of App. 
1955); 
In re Warren, 243 P. 2d 632 (Wash. 1952) ; 
In re Rinker, 117 A. 2d 780 (Pa. Sup. 1955); 
Pettit v. Engelking, 260 S.W. 2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1953). 
Custody controversies of this nature do not arise in 
vacuo, but because someone either desires to impress their 
standards of conduct upon the parent or child, or desires 
to avail themselves of the juvenile court as an adoption 
court, or both. 
Ford v. State, 104 N.E. 2d 406 (Ind. App. 1952); 
In re Knight, 212 La. 357, 31 So. 2d 825 (1947); 
People v. Hmton, 330 Ill. App. 130, 70 N.E. 2d 261 
(1946); 
Carrera v. Kelly, 283 P. 2d 162 (Colo. 1955 ). 
The Washington Supreme Court in the Warren. case 
said, at page 633, in reference to their statute: 
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The juvenile court has no jurisdiction over a minor 
unless it is proved that the minor is either (a) de-
linquent or (b) a dependent child. In re Miller, 
Wash., 242 P. 2d 1016. The concept that all chil-
dren are wards of the state, and that the state and 
its agencies have an unhampered right to deter-
mine "what is best for the child," is not a recent 
or an advanced idea. It belongs to a repudiated, 
political and moral philosophy foreign and repug-
nant to American institutions. Stated more specif-
ically, the mere fact that certain individuals invoke 
the aid of our courts to litigate the question of who 
shall have the custody and control of a minor, does 
not, ipso facto, vest our courts with jurisdiction to 
decide the issues presented. The court must :first 
find the child either delinquent or dependent. 
The philosophy expressed in the Rimker case is par-
ticularly apropos the present controversy. There the 
court said, at page 783: 
A child cannot be declared ''neglected' ' mere-
ly because his condition might be improved by 
changing his parents. The welfare of many chil-
dren might be served by taking them from their 
homes and placing them in what the officials may 
consider a better home. But the Juyenile Court 
I~aw was not intended to provide a procedure to 
take the children of the poor and giYe them to the 
rich, nor to take the children of the illiterate and 
give them to the educated, nor to take the children 
of the crude and giYe them to the eultured, nor to 
take the children of the weak and sickly and give 
them to the strong and healthy. 
The power of the juvenile court is not to ad-
judicate what is for the best interests of a child, 
but to adjudicate "'"hether or not the child is 
neglected. 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
That past conditions and conduct are not sufficient to 
bring a child within the purview of the ''neglected child'' 
provisions of statutes such as ours is well established. 
In re Johnson, 110 Utah 500, 175 P. 2d 486 (1946); 
In re Knight, 212 La. 357, 31 So. 2d 825 (1947); 
Pettit v. Engelking, 260 S.W. 2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1953); 
In re Rinker, 117 A. 2d 780 (Pa. Sup. 1955). 
The rule of lavv vvhich the petitioner asks to be 
applied in this case is that upon a showing of evidence of 
past nonconformity on the part of a parent, that parent's 
child shall be declared a ward of the juvenile court and 
immediately adopted by strangers to the court. This rule 
allows no locus poenitentiae. It is an innovation to our 
law. No authority for this rule has been found. And it 
is submitted that such a rule as novv espoused by the 
petitioner shocks the human conscience, is repugnant 
to a sense of fair play and is contrary to minimum stand-
ards of human dignity. 
Under these circumstances, the decision of counsel 
not to prolong a hearing by introducing rebuttal evidence 
against what is submitted is immaterial evidence and 
upon which the petitioner has the strong and clear burden 
of persuasion cannot be construed as a judicial admission. 
Considering the factors and circumstances of the case 
this evidence is not even competent to show past neglect. 
Even taking the evidence in the light least favorat le 
to Gordon, there is insufficient competent evidence 1.11 
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the record to sustain a finding of present neglect. It must 
be here noted that most of the evidence introduced by 
the petitioner in this regard was not found to be fact by 
the court. The court made certain specific findings of fact 
as required by statute. As to other matters the court only 
recited that certain witnesses had testified as to certain 
matters. This does not meet the requirement for specific 
findings. 
The third allegation that Gordon has neglected and 
refused to provide subsistence, medical care, etc., is 
equally without merit in this proceeding. The arguments 
previously enumerated concerning the necessity of pres-
ent neglect are incorporated herein by reference. 
A divergence of views as to the adequacy of past 
medical care is not present neglect. Unless the child is in 
present danger of an extreme degree the court will not 
impose its vie,vs in these matters upon a parent, and even 
then such action is taken ''ith greatest reluctance and 
onlv to the minimum extent necessa.rv. 
o' • 
In re Hudson, 126 P. 2d 765 (\·rash. 1942). 
Even strong dissatisfaction "Tith a parent's past 
treatment of his child is not grounds in law for summarily 
ordering that such child be adopted by unknown persons. 
,Justice may he blind, but must it be cruel also f 
If, within the scope of this third allegation, Karl is 
a neglected child, "'"P need but look to Susan and the 
Soeiety to pinpoint responsibiltiy. 
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If the judgment of the lower court is to be s ~stained, 
it can only be sustained if the following question would 
be answered in the affirmative by this court: lLssuming 
Gordon's wife to be no'v pregnant or to become so in the 
future, would this court, upon the record now be fore it in 
this case, be justified in depriving Gordon of the custody 
of such a child in the event something untoward happened 
to the mother~ 
If Gordon IS the unfit creature which the peti-
tioner would have us believe he is, why has not the So-
ciety suggested any of the many steps possible to effect 
a rehabilitation so that he and his son may be reunited~ 
One wonders if the failure so to do is not an indication 
that there never was either an intention or desire to do 
otherwise than dispose of l{arl through the placement 
facilities of the Society. 
The fourth allegation is that the child is in a situation 
dangerous to his health and morals. 
The arguments set forth with reference to the other 
three allegations are in point here, and are hereby incor-
porated by reference. The court did not find on this alle-
gation and therefore the finding to be inferred is against 
the petitioner. 
POINT III. 
THE COUR.T ERRED IN ADMITTING AND 
IN CONSIDERING IN ITS DECISIO·N EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING ALLEGED ADO·PTIVE P'ARE·NT'S. 
The testimony of 'vitnesses for the petitioner, and 
particularly Virginia Lee Bennett herself support the 
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conclusion that she and the Society connived to keep Karl 
from his father. 
On February 7, 1956, Susan contacted the Children's 
Service Society about placing her and Gordon's child 
there (R. 55). Virginia Lee Bennett admits that no at-
tempt was made to search for either the birth certificate 
of the child or for the name of the father (R. 85)ce She no-
tarized the authorization to take the child (R. 85) and on 
February 9, 1956, the Society took custody of the child 
from Susan (R. 55). Virginia Lee Bennett now asserts 
that Susan gave her the \Yrong birthdate and name of the 
father, and that, therefore, a search could not be made 
(R. 85). No reference is ever made by her that she ever 
tried to get more detailed information from Susan in 
order to locate the father. The conclusion is inescapable 
that there was no desire to know this information - a 
predetermined conclusion, arrived at without a proper 
investigation or hearing, that the father ought to be de-
prived of his rights to the child (R. 90). 
On November 21, 1956, Susan had already told the 
Society that she no longer wanted the child (R. 58). On 
December 12, 1956, without attempting to locate the fa-
ther (R. 86), a hearing was held in which the court found 
the child to be dependent and neglected. The true name of 
the father and the true birthdate of the child \Yere known 
prior to this hearing (R. 1, 84). 
On January 19, 1957, eleYen months after the Society 
took custody of Karl, the Society \Yas advised that a 
hearing ought to be held to deprive the father of his 
rights (R. 59, 88). This \vns before any attempts had been 
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made to locate the father or any investigation made con-
cerning him or his rights. 
In August or September, 1956, Virginia Lee Bennett 
knew Lee (R. 80) and that Lee knew J. Gordon Bailey, 
father of l(arl (R. 80) and in December she received per-
sonal kno"\vledge of their 'vedding (R. 81). Even so, no 
mention was made to Lee, nor to Gordon, about the child 
(R. 85, 86). Shortly after Christmas, in the month of De-
cember, 1956, Lee informed her that she and Gordon were 
going to take a trip to California (R. 81). Even at this 
time no n1ention 'vas made to Lee about Gordon's child 
or the proceedings which were in progress (R. 86). It is 
equally obvious that during the several occasions when 
Virginia Lee Bennett called the parents of Lee, that she 
did not tell them about Gordon's child or its pre-
dicament (R. 80). 
Not until April 19, 1957, fourteen months after the 
Society obtained possession of Karl, was Gordon called 
and asked to come in concerning the boy (R. 60). Gor-
don kept this appointment (R. 60), but was offered no 
information about the boy, offered no assistance in re-
gaining him, instead he was then and there asked to 
sign his child away (R. 86). 
Gordon refused, informing the Society he "'\\7anted to 
keep the child ( R. 71, 81). 
Gordon and counsel visited Virginia Lee Bennett 
shortly thereafter and were told that the child had not 
been placed for adoption (R. 346), yet even while making 
that_statement, if we are to place credence in the rest of 
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her testimony, she knew that the child had been placed in 
a foster home for fourteen and one-~alf months, that the 
foster home parents had applied for adoption, and that 
the Society had approved their qualification (R. 349, 350). 
Immediately following all these futile efforts by Gor-
don to see and regain custody of his only child, Virginia 
Lee Bennett filed the present petition alleging that Gor-
don had neglected and abandoned his child. The sequence 
of events suggest the possibility of a long-range pre-
conceived plan to see that Gordon did not regain his son. 
Plan or no plan the evidence about the foster parents is 
immaterial to any issue then before the court in this statu-
tory neglect proceeding, but was materially persuasive 
according to the finding, conclusion and judgment. 
In re Warren, 243 P. 2d 632 (Wash. 1952). 
Adoption agencies " .. ho hire foster parents to tempo-
rarily rare for children in their custody are usually care-
ful not to mislead sueh foster home parents into believing 
that they have any rights to the children in their care. 
It is a perversion of the legitmate use of the juvenile 
court that it be used to facilitate adoption proceedings 
which cannot otherwise be accomplished because a parent 
will not willingly relinquish his o" .. n child into the per-
manent future care and custody of strangers. 
The repugnanc.e felt at the u8e of this type of pro-
ceeding is expressed \Yithout reserYation in Carrera v. 
J(ellcy, ~83 P. ~d 16~ (Colo. 1955). Perhaps the author of 
that opinion is a father. 
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It is unfortunate that the abstract only "vas published 
in People v. Hinton., 330 Ill. App. 130, 70 N.E. 2d 261 
(1946), for though there are undoubtedly differences in 
the statutes and in the nature of the misuse, the published 
abstract well conveys the judicial dislike of abuse of 
actions of this type. Part reads : 
To permit neglected child proceedings insti-
gated by paternal grandfather against n1other to 
be prosecuted in interest of grandfather ty special 
counsel hired by grandfather, and to allov;r the case 
to be used as an opening wedge for divorce, was 
not an exercise of county court's sound discre-
tion, and was error requiring reversal of order 
depriving mother of custody of child. 
There is no justification for ignoring Utah Code Ann. 
1953, 55-10-30, which limits the power of the court in the 
matter of its judgment, or Utah Code ~.Lnn. 1953, 55-10-31, 
whieh contemplates a retention of continuing jurisdiction 
as long as the child is a ward of the court, or the preferred 
rights of parents guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
55-10-32, or the rights of a parent to regain custody of his 
child given him by Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-41, and 
for summarily acting in the capacity of an adoption court. 
Even Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-43, which purports to 
authorize the court's approval of adoptions cannot be con-
,strued to bypass the plain import of the law and the pro-
tections afforded a parent and child. This provision must 
be construed in the light of the other provisions and the 
court decisions construing them. 
In Ford v. Stale, 104 N.E. 2d 406, 407 (Ind. App. 
1952) the court said : 
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with a minimum of disruption is to be denied the inalien-
able right of all children to grow to maturity in the home 
of their natural parent because an adoption agency so 
desires. 
POINT IV. 
THE O·RDER PURPO·RT~NG TO DEPRIVE J. 
GO,RDON BAILEY PERMANENTLY O·F ALL 
RIGHTS TO THE CUSTODY OF HIS SO~N AND TO 
AUTHO·RIZE HIS ADOPTION IS VOID BEC'AUSE 
IT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS AND 
IS CO·NTRARY TO LAW. 
Even if the court's finding of neglect should stand, 
its order permanently depriving Gordon of his son is 
void. 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-32, provides, for our 
purposes: 
No child ... shall be taken from the custody 
of its parents ... unless the court shall find from 
the evidence introduced in the case that such par-
ent . . . has knowingly failed and neglected to 
provide for such child the proper maintenance, 
care, training, and education contemplated andre-
quired by both law and morals, ... or unless the 
court shall find from all the circumstances of the 
case that public welfare or the welfare of the child 
requires that his custody be taken from its 
parents ... 
One searches the findings in vain for a statement that 
Gordon has either ''knowingly failed and neglected to pro-
vide ... '' or ''that the public welfare or the welfare of 
the child requires'' that Gordon be deprived of his cus-
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tody. What the court did conclude is that in its opinion it 
would be best for Karl to remain with those unidentified 
persons whom the Society assert desire to adopt Karl. 
Such a finding does not meet the requirements of the law 
for it is vastly different from either of the findings re-
quired to validly deprive a parent of his child, even 
temporarily. 
Nor does the evidence support either ground, for 
the only conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are 
that l{arl was as healthy, at least, as the average child 
and that he was not deprived of care necessary for his 
well being. Though Gordon's income at the time of the 
hearing may have been modest it was sufficient. He is debt 
free, owns a car and a truck, lives in a home which boasts 
all the modern conveniences, and he is ready, willing, and 
able to support his child. Surely the fight he is now 
waging for the return of his child is indicative of his de-
termination to care for his child himself. 
The point no"\v under debate is whether the juvenile 
court has the po·w·er in a proceeding such as this to per-
manently deprive a parent of the rights to his child, with-
out any further limitation on the court's power than that 
it find the child neglected. The better reasoning compels 
a negative ans,Yer, although no direct authority in point 
has been found. 
{Ttah Code Ann. 1943, 55-10-30, enumerates the per-
missible judgments in a neglect action. This section is 
devoid of any authority for a complete seYerance of the 
parent-r.hild relationship. It expressly provides that the 
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preference of parents shall be given due- consideration. 
The last portion of this section is limited by the phrase 
"to the end that its wayward tendencies shall be correct-
ed and the child saved to useful citizenship'' which clearly 
limits this provision to delinquency cases. 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-31, expressly provides 
for continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-41, provides a means for 
the parent to regain his child upon a showing of changed 
circumstances at any time. 
It is not to be seriously contended that Utah Code 
Ann. 1953, 55-10-43, allows a permanent deprivation of 
all rights any time there is evidence of persons who desire 
to adopt a child in the custody of the court. If so, why has 
the legislature not openly bestowed adoption jurisdiction 
upon the juvenile court~ 
Only the district court has power to effect an adop-
tion, and limits are placed upon its power. The power of 
the juvenile court to authorize an adoption must be with-
in the limits of the district court to effect one. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4, apparently considerably lon-
ger a part of Utah law than the present definition of 
"neglected child," covers, for the purpose of the case at 
bar, only instances when the parent has been judicially 
deprived of the custody of his child on account of ''cruel-
ty, neglect or desertion.'' 
There is no authority nor basis in logic to assume 
that ''neglect'' in the one provision means the same as 
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"neglected child" in the other. One is for the purpose of 
foregoing the necessity of parental consent in an adoption 
proceeding; the other is for the purpose of defining the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. To construe ''neglect'' 
in the adoption statute to be synonymous with ''neglected 
child'' in the juvenile court law would undoubtedly be 
unconstitutional for it would result in the possibility of 
a parent's losing his child forever upon any finding of 
neglect. Such a construction would run contrary to the 
many provisions in the law designed to preserve the in-
tegrity of the family unit._ 
There may be instances in which the juvenile court 
might find such cruelty, neglect or desertion as would jus-
tify the district court, upon an examination of the record 
from the juvenile court, in proceeding with an adoption. 
There is no such finding in this case and since the district 
court could not validly order an adoption neither can 
the juvenile court validly authorize it. 
In addition, the minimum requirements of procedur-
al due process require that a person be given notice of 
the cause of action alleged against him and some indica-
tion of the relief demanded. The petition is silent in 
regard to adoption of J{arl by others. The issue of adop-
tion was not tried " .. ith the consent of the parties -
Gordon properly objected. In such a situation as this a 
judgment exceeding the scope of the petition is invalid. 
Fisher v. B;~~lu.nd, 97 Utah 463, 93 P. 2d 737 (1940). 
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POINT V. 
EVEN ASSUMING THE JUVENILE COURT 
TO· HAVE HAD THE POWER TO TEMPORARILY 
DEPRIVE J. GORDON BAILEY OF' THE ClUSTODY 
OF HIS S.ON, T'O DO SO, WAS AN ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION AND CONTRARY TO L·A W. 
The previous argument concerning the failure of the 
Court to find that the welfare of the child or of society 
required depriving Gordon of the custody of his son, 
is hereby incorporated by reference. 
Whether gauged against the statutory enactments of 
the juvenile court law or against the judicially formed 
precedents in habeas corpus custody proceedings there is 
no justification for not returning Karl to his father. 
In re Bradley, 109 Utah 538, 167 P. 2d 978 (1946); 
B aldttoin v. Nielson, 110 Utah 172, 170 P. 2d 179 ( 1946) ; 
Devera.ux v. Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30, 268 P. 2d 995 
(1954); 
When it has been felt necessary to separate a child 
from his parents, extreme judicial restraint has been ex-
ercised to protect the right of the parent to the future cus-
tody of his child and the right of the child to his parent. 
In the Bradley case this court affirmed the lower 
court's finding that the child was neglected. The mother 
had intentionally left the child with others. She know-
ingly failed ancl neglected to provide for it. This court 
affirmed a temporary deprivation of custody on the 
ground that under then presently existing conditions the 
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welfare of the child required that it be not immediately 
returned to its mother. But in so doing, this court said, 
at page 985: 
This does not mean that Barbara will be for-
ever barred from obtaining the custody of her 
baby, the child remains a ward of the juvenile 
court, and the custody of the child may be changed 
when justified by the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. 
In the instant case there is no competent evidence 
whatsoever to sustain even a temporary deprivation of 
custody. The court did not find Gordon unfit. It did not 
find his wife unfit. The court felt that because of Gordon's 
"faults and habits and manner of living" the child would 
be better off with its present custodians. This does not 
meet the requirements set in the law for depriving a par-
ent of his child. 
Utah Code ~\.nn. 1953, 55-10-32. 
Even proof of past immorality or misconduct can 
only depriYe a parent of the present right to his child 
"Then there is an inescapable conclusion that such mis-
conduct will haYc a present effect upon the child, and 
even then a child will not be placed upon the auction 
block without giYing the parent an opportunity to reform. 
It is the present conditions under which the child will 
liYe, not the past conduct of the parent, that is decisiYe. 
l~u re Llliller, ~42 P. 2d 1016 (\\Tash. 1952); 
I)etfit v. E-n,qelking, ~60 S.W. 2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1953): 
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In re Bradley, 109 Utah 538, 167 P.2d 978 (1946); 
In re Johnson, 110 Utah 500, 175 P. 2d 486 (1946); 
In re Zerick,. 129 N.E. 2d 661 (Ohio Juv. 1955); 
In re Brya.n, 48 Nev. 352, 232 P. 776, 37 A.L.R. 527 
(1925); 
In the Z erick case the court said at page 665 : 
Even where the state compels the parental 
surrender of a child because of unfavorable cir-
cumstances clearly detrimental to the welfare of 
the child, it will not order permanent surrender of 
the parental rights and duties if effective control 
over the child can be established through the 
awarding of temporary guardianship and legal 
custody without ending for all time these final 
rights and duties. Ordinarily a parent though de-
clared unfit will be permitted to reclaim the child 
when the circumstances change for the better. Any 
other policy would be harsh and cruel to the par-
ent, a denial to the child of its natural birthright 
and contrary to public policy. 
In Sta.te v. Black, 3 Utah 2d 135, 283 P. 2d 887 (1955 ), 
is the statement that'' unless the polygamous relationship 
and the unlawful cohabitation between Leonard Black 
and Vera Black cease, arnd completely, that the Juvenile 
Court should take the children from the appellants p·erma-
nently. '' Unless wrenched out of context, this statement 
cannot be offered to support the proposition that a child 
should be withheld from its parent because of past, now 
terminated, misconduct. The holding in the Black case is 
not authority for the present controversy because of ob-
vious factual differences. At the time of the petition in 
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the Black case the children were living with their parents 
and their parents were openly violating the criminal law 
of the state of Utah and teaching their children to do 
likewise. 
If the court's reference to the "faults and habits and 
manner of living" is based on relative material affluence, 
such a comparison is insufficient to support a deprivation 
of custody. 
In re W a.rren, 243 P. 2d 632 (Wash. 1952). 
It is also contrary to the evidence. There was no evi-
dence introduced to the effect that Gordon could not pres-
ently support his child. All the evidence is to the con-
trary. Gordon is healthy, willing and able to care for his 
child. His wife, though a divorced woman who has never 
raised any children, is a refined, educated person. She is 
a good cook, an excellent seamstress, a;nd most important 
of all, she desires to care for Karl and to adopt him 
as her own. 
POINT VI. 
THE· JUDGMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE CONCLU-
SIONS O·F LAW DO NOT SUPPORT IT. 
rrhis argument is essentially a resume of the previous 
arguments, whirh for the sake of brevity "\\rill not be here 
repeated. 
Utah (~ode Ann. 1953, 55-10-30, requires that the ju-
Yenile court ''shall ent<:)r in 'Yriting the facts constituting 
such ... negleet ... '' 
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Point II of this argument shows that the judgment 
of neglect is not supported by the findings of fact. Points 
IV and V concern the validity of the judgment perma-
nently depriving Gordon of his child, or even of tempo-
rarily depriving Gordon of his child, and show that the 
judgment of the court exceeds the findings of fact. These 
arguments are hereby incorporated by reference. 
The statutes of this state have established those con-
ditions under which the juvenile court may act. They also 
have established the requirements for the various actions 
within the scope of the court's power. 
These facts must be found by the court or its judg-
ment cannot stand. A discussion of part of the evidence 
and the court's reasoning as to why it arrived at its de-
cision do not constitute the required findings. 
Interstate Circui.t, Inc., v. [T. 8., 304 U. S. 55, 58 S. Ct. 
768, 82 L. Ed. 1146 (1938). 
The court's recital that certain witnesses testified as 
to certain matters does not constitute a finding that the 
matters so tesified to were true. The deliberate stating 
that he found certain facts to be true and the equally de-
liberate stating that certain matters were testified to neg-
atives any inference that the court found both categories 
to be true. 
A judgment not supported by the findings of fact 
must fail. 
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U.S. v. Seminole Nations, 299 U.S. 417, 57 S. St. 283, 
81 L. Ed. 216 (1937). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief, the Appellant 
submits that the judgment of the juvenile court is .erro-
neous, and that upon the thorough examination of the rec-
ord, which is this court's responsibility, that this court 
will concur that the judgment of the juvenile court must 
be reversed. 
It is respectfully submitted that the juvenile court 
erred in not finding Karl Bernett Bailey to be the legiti-
mate son of J. Gordon Bailey and in not granting the 
prayer in Appellant's cross petition. It is further sub-
mitted that the juvenile court erred in finding Karl Ber-
nett Bailey to be a neglected child, in entering its order 
permanently depriving J. Gordon Bailey of all rights to 
the custody of his son and in simultaneously authorizing 
the adoption of Karl Bernett Bailey by strangers. 
The Appellant prays that this court enter its order 
finding Karl Bernett Bailey to be the legitimate son of 
J. Gordon Bailey, Appellant, reYersing the :finding of 
neglect and restoring to the Appellant the custody and 
care of his son \Vi thout the continued jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court. 
But if this court dPe lines to grant in its entirety the 
above prayer of the Appellant, the Appellant prays that 
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this Court take such action upon such terms as it deems 
just to the end that the Appellant may with a minimum 
of unnecessary delay have the custody and care of his 
son restored to him. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT L. SCHMID 
Attorney for J. Gordon Bailey, 
Appellant. 
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